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Short Abstract: According to retail realism, we ought to abandon whole-
sale arguments, which purport to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about
theoretical entities in general, and embrace retail arguments, which purport
to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about specific kinds of theoretical en-
tities. My aim is to argue that there is a further wholesale element that
retail realism must avoid in order to qualify as a viable position. In order
to do so, I distinguish between what I call wholesale and retail treatments
of theoretical entities. Wholesale treatments individuate theoretical entities
in such a way that the same entity can appear in distinct theories. In that
case, realism about a given entity implies realism about that entity as it ap-
pears in a number of distinct theories. Retail treatments, on the other hand,
individuate theoretical entities more finely, so that distinct theories actually
involve distinct entities. In that case, realism about one entity needn’t imply
realism about a similar, but distinct, entity. I argue that retail realists ought
to reject wholesale treatments in favor of retail treatments, and I do so by
examining a case from the history of chemistry involving the hypothetical
constituent of hydrochloric acid known as the muriatic radical. I argue that
there are distinct muriatic radicals in distinct theories, and that we ought to
be realists about some, but not others. Hence, in this case, a retail treat-
ment is preferable to a wholesale one, and I conclude by discussing why the
combination of retail realism and retail treatments constitutes an attractive
position within the scientific realism debate more generally.
1Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, email: jonathon [dot]
hricko [at] gmail [dot] com.
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Long Abstract: One of the central questions of the scientific realism debate
concerns the existence of theoretical entities. According to retail realism,
we ought to abandon wholesale arguments, which purport to demonstrate
realism or anti-realism about theoretical entities in general, and embrace
retail arguments, which purport to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about
specific kinds of theoretical entities. My aim is to argue that there is a
further wholesale element that retail realism must avoid in order to qualify
as a viable position. In order to do so, I distinguish between what I call
wholesale and retail treatments of theoretical entities. Wholesale treatments
individuate theoretical entities in such a way that the same entity can appear
in distinct theories, which may contain conflicting descriptions of the entity in
question. In that case, realism about a given entity implies realism about that
entity as it appears in a number of distinct theories. Retail treatments, on
the other hand, individuate theoretical entities more finely, so that distinct
theories actually involve distinct entities. In that case, realism about one
entity needn’t imply realism about a similar, but distinct, entity. I argue
that retail realists ought to reject wholesale treatments in favor of retail
treatments.
In order to make this argument, I discuss a case from the history of
chemistry, namely, the case of the muriatic radical. In the late eighteenth
century, Antoine Lavoisier held that all acids are composed of oxygen and
another component, which Lavoisier called the radical; and that acids differ
from one another insofar as they have different radicals. Though he couldn’t
decompose muriatic acid to show that it contains oxygen, he hypothesized
that it is composed of oxygen and an unknown radical—the muriatic radical.
In 1810, Humphry Davy argued, contrary to Lavoisier’s hypothesis, that
muriatic acid is composed of hydrogen and chlorine, and so it is what we
now call hydrochloric acid. After an initial period of opposition to Davy’s
views, Jo¨ns Jacob Berzelius went on to develop a view of acids that can be
seen as a synthesis of Lavoisier’s and Davy’s views. Lavoisier was correct
about so-called oxygenous acids, while Davy was correct about muriatic acid
because the latter is not an oxygenous acid, but rather a hydracid. Hydracids
are composed of hydrogen combined with a radical, in which case the muriatic
radical for Berzelius is chlorine.
A wholesale treatment would imply that both Lavoisier and Berzelius
were employing the same theoretical entity. A retail treatment, on the other
hand, would imply that Lavoisier’s radical and Berzelius’s radical are distinct
theoretical entities. I argue in favor of a retail treatment, on the grounds that
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distinguishing Lavoisier’s radical from Berzelius’s allows us to be anti-realists
about the former, and realists about the latter. In this case, then, a retail
treatment yields a desirable kind of selective realism which is unavailable
to a proponent of a wholesale treatment. I conclude by discussing why the
combination of retail realism and retail treatments constitutes an attractive
position within the scientific realism debate more generally.
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1 Retail Realism
One of the central questions of the scientific realism debate is whether or not
the entities posited in our best scientific theories exist. Realists claim that
such theoretical entities do exist, while anti-realists either claim that they
don’t, or that we ought to be agnostic about whether they do.
Magnus and Callender (2004) have pointed out that there are, in fact, two
types of arguments that philosophers involved in the realism debate, whether
realists or anti-realists, use in order to answer questions about the existence
of theoretical entities. On the one hand, there are “wholesale arguments,”
which are “arguments about all or most of the entities posited in our best
scientific theories”; on the other hand, there are “retail arguments” which
are “arguments about specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance”
(ibid.: 321). Magnus and Callender go on to argue that the only viable way
forward in the realism debate requires that we abandon wholesale arguments,
and focus on retail arguments. Once we do, we must reject wholesale real-
ism and anti-realism. The only kind of realism that survives is a kind of
retail realism about some entities but not others—as they put it, “there may
be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist about top
quarks, and so on” (ibid.: 333). They admit that such a situation may cause
discomfort to both realists and anti-realists, but this is a price that Magnus
and Callender are willing to pay to make progress in the debate.
A glance at recent work in the realism debate shows that there is much
of which Magnus and Callender would approve. As Dicken (2013) argues,
one can find retail realism in the work of a number of philosophers, includ-
ing Psillos (2009), Saatsi (2010), and Stanford (2006). Moreover, given that
much of the debate has centered on specific kinds of entities, like phlogiston,
caloric, and the optical ether, there is no shortage of retail arguments on
offer.1 While wholesale arguments have not been abandoned by all philoso-
phers involved in the debate, it’s fair to say that many philosophers have
chosen to focus their efforts on retail arguments instead.
There are at least two main reasons why philosophers have deemed it a
good idea to abandon wholesale arguments in favor of retail arguments. The
first has to do with what are perhaps the two most influential arguments
in the realism debate, namely, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic
1See, for example, the discussion of phlogiston in Ladyman (2011), the discussion of
caloric in Chang (2003), and the discussion of the optical ether in Cordero (2011).
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meta-induction. According to the no-miracles argument, the explanatory and
predictive success of our best scientific theories would be miraculous if those
theories weren’t genuinely referential and at least approximately true. This
argument is usually taken to support some form of realism. The pessimistic
meta-induction, on the other hand, draws upon our past theories, which were
successful but false, as an inductive basis for inferring inductively that our
current successful theories are false as well. It is usually taken to support
some form of anti-realism. A number of philosophers have argued that both
arguments are best construed as statistical arguments, and that as such,
both suffer from the base rate fallacy. Howson (2000, 52–54) has argued
that the no-miracles argument ignores the base rate of true theories in a
population, and Lewis (2001) has argued that the pessimistic meta-induction
does as well. The unavailability of these base rates is Magnus and Callender’s
primary reason for thinking that realists and anti-realists are mostly talking
past one another, and for abandoning wholesale arguments in favor of retail
arguments.
The second reason for abandoning wholesale arguments has to do with
Laudan’s confutation of realism (Laudan, 1981).2 In the spirit of the no-
miracles argument, realists claim that the success of our best theories pro-
vides evidence for their approximate truth. Laudan, in response, presents a
long list of purported counterexamples to this claim. The list includes the
phlogiston theory of combustion, the wave theory of light, and the caloric the-
ory of heat, which were all quite successful in their day. But given that these
theories involve terms (‘phlogiston,’ ‘ether,’ and ‘caloric’) that the realist cat-
egorizes as paradigm cases of empty names, these are theories that, by the
realist’s own lights, presumably fail to be even approximately true.3 Given
that Laudan’s argument depends on the details of the theories he discusses,
responses to his argument, and responses to those responses, have focused on
specific entities posited in specific theories. As such, these responses count
as retail arguments, as opposed to wholesale arguments. Laudan’s argument
has also motivated philosophers to search for other theories that may spell
trouble for the realist, which, in turn, has led to even more retail arguments.4
2Although it is common to read Laudan as advancing a form of the pessimistic meta-
induction, Lyons (2002) shows that he is not.
3But as Frost-Arnold (2011, 2013) has recently argued, this may not render such theo-
ries false—given some commonly-held views in semantics, such theories may actually lack
truth-values.
4Vickers (2013) provides a useful list of the theories that such philosophers have dis-
5
For these and other reasons, I take it that retail realism represents a
genuine step forward in the realism debate. That said, there are a number
of ways in which to develop this position, and I’ll argue that some ways are
better than others.
To that end, in section 2, I’ll distinguish two ways of developing retail
realism, which I call wholesale and retail treatments of theoretical entities.
Wholesale treatments individuate theoretical entities in such a way that the
same entity can appear in distinct theories, which may contain conflicting
descriptions of the entity in question. In that case, realism about a given
entity implies realism about that entity as it appears in a number of distinct
theories. Retail treatments, on the other hand, individuate theoretical en-
tities more finely, so that distinct theories actually involve distinct entities.
In that case, realism about one entity needn’t imply realism about a similar,
but distinct, entity. My primary goal is to argue that retail realists ought to
reject wholesale treatments in favor of retail treatments.
My argument will make use of a case from the history of chemistry,
namely, the case of the muriatic radical, and in section 3, I discuss the de-
tails of that case. In the late eighteenth century, Antoine Lavoisier held that
all acids are composed of oxygen and another component, which Lavoisier
called the radical; and that acids differ from one another insofar as they have
different radicals. Though he couldn’t decompose muriatic acid to show that
it contains oxygen, he hypothesized that it is composed of oxygen and an
unknown radical—the muriatic radical. In 1810, Humphry Davy argued,
contrary to Lavoisier’s hypothesis, that muriatic acid is composed of hydro-
gen and chlorine, and so it is what we now call hydrochloric acid. After an
initial period of opposition to Davy’s views, Jo¨ns Jacob Berzelius went on
to develop a view of acids that can be seen as a synthesis of Lavoisier’s and
Davy’s views. Lavoisier was correct about so-called oxygenous acids, while
Davy was correct about muriatic acid because the latter is not an oxygenous
acid, but rather a hydracid. Hydracids are composed of hydrogen combined
with a radical, in which case the muriatic radical for Berzelius is chlorine.
A wholesale treatment would imply that both Lavoisier and Berzelius
were, in one way or another, employing the same theoretical entity, while a
retail treatment would imply that Lavoisier’s radical and Berzelius’s radical
are distinct theoretical entities. In section 4, I argue in favor of a retail treat-
ment, on the grounds that distinguishing Lavoisier’s radical from Berzelius’s
cussed, as well as some previously undiscussed cases that are of potential interest.
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allows us to be anti-realists about the former, and realists about the latter.
In this case, then, a retail treatment yields a desirable kind of selective re-
alism which is unavailable to a proponent of a wholesale treatment. Finally,
in section 5, I conclude by discussing why the combination of retail realism
and retail treatments constitutes an attractive position within the scientific
realism debate more generally.
2 Wholesale and Retail Treatments of Theo-
retical Entities
My primary goal is to argue that there is a further wholesale element that
retail realism must avoid so as to qualify as a viable position. In order to do
so, my aim in this section is to introduce the notions of wholesale and retail
treatments of theoretical entities. In the remainder of the paper, I will argue
that retail realists should avoid the former, and adopt the latter instead.
Before we’re able to see what these treatments are and how they differ
from one another, though, we must start by first recalling that retail realists
restrict their arguments to specific kinds of theoretical entities. To take a
concrete example, in response to the question “Are there atoms?”, Magnus
and Callender claim that a retail realist will cite “the same evidence scientists
use to support the atomic hypothesis; e.g., Einstein and Smoluchowski’s
Brownian motion theory and the experiments by Perrin in 1908” (op. cit.:
321). More generally, retail realists seek to answer questions of the form:
‘Are there xs?’, where x stands for some theoretical entity. Realists about x
will answer ‘Yes,’ while anti-realists about x will answer ‘No.’
In order to avoid familiar puzzles concerning speaking of what is not, I
suggest that these questions, along with the notion of a theoretical entity,
be understood in a particular way. To a first approximation, realists and
anti-realists share an understanding of a given theoretical entity in a sense
similar to the one in which theists, atheists, and agnostics share an under-
standing of God—there is some consensus regarding what the entity would
be like if it existed, and the debate concerns whether it does, in fact, exist.
This notion of a theoretical entity can usefully be understood in terms of
what Rheinberger (1997) calls “epistemic things” and what Chang (2011)
calls “epistemic objects.” In Chang’s words, these are “objects as we con-
ceive them in our interaction with them, without a presumption that our
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conceptions correspond in some intractable sense to the shape of an ‘exter-
nal’ world that is entirely divorced from ourselves” (ibid.: 413). As I will use
the terminology, then, a theoretical entity is an epistemic object in Chang’s
sense—it’s a conception involved in our theorizing about the world. When
philosophers engaged in the realism debate ask whether a theoretical entity
exists, then, they are not asking whether scientists currently have or pre-
viously had such-and-such a conception. Instead, they are asking whether
there is the right kind of correspondence between that conception and entities
that exist independently of our minds, which I will call empirical entities.5
Realists claim that there is such a correspondence, while antirealists either
deny that there is, or claim that we cannot know.
In that case, if retail arguments are to provide any guidance regarding
the attitudes which we ought to take towards various theoretical entities,
one first needs to know how to individuate theoretical entities. A glance
at the history of science shows that this is not as straightforward as one
might initially think. Consider, for example, Dalton’s atom in contrast to
Boscovich’s, or Stahl’s phlogiston in contrast to Priestley’s, or Lavoisier’s
caloric in contrast to Carnot’s, or Dirac’s positron in contrast to Anderson’s,
or Lorentz’s electron in contrast to Millikan’s. In such cases, one can ask
whether the scientists in question were working with the same theoretical
entity, or with distinct entities.
At this point, we can be clear about what wholesale and retail treatments
of theoretical entities amount to. Wholesale treatments are committed to the
claim that the same theoretical entity can appear in distinct theories, even if
those theories involve conflicting descriptions of the entity in question. Re-
tail treatments, on the other hand, are committed to the claim that distinct
theories involve distinct theoretical entities, even if those entities sometimes
share striking similarities. Retail treatments, then, commit one to individ-
uating entities as finely as one individuates theories. Wholesale treatments,
in contrast, commit one to individuating entities at a grain coarser than the
grain at which one individuates theories. Retail and wholesale treatments,
then, concern different ways of individuating theoretical entities.
These competing ways of individuating theoretical entities have implica-
tions for the realism debate, which I’ve characterized as involving questions
5Being more precise about the right kind of correspondence would obviously involve
addressing many central issues in philosophy, and for the sake of brevity, I must leave these
issues unaddressed and work with an intuitive notion of the correspondence in question.
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about the relations between our theoretical entities and empirical entities
that exist in the world. Retail realists are thus faced with a choice concern-
ing which treatment to adopt, and each treatment lends itself to a distinct
position regarding realism about a given theoretical entity. On the one hand,
if a retail realist adopts a wholesale treatment, then realism about some the-
oretical entity implies realism about that entity as it appears in a number
of distinct theories. On the other hand, if a retail realist adopts a retail
treatment, then realism about some theoretical entity needn’t imply realism
about a similar, but distinct, entity drawn from a distinct theory. And, of
course, similar remarks apply to anti-realism about various kinds of entities.
In short, then, wholesale treatments lead to either wholesale acceptance or
wholesale rejection of a theoretical entity as it appears in a number of dis-
tinct theories, while retail treatments allow for the possibility of proceeding
on a case-by-case basis, which can lead to a kind of selective realism about
some theoretical entities, but not others.
While the terminology that I have chosen to adopt here may be new, the
ideas themselves are not, and both wholesale and retail treatments have had
their defenders. To take a prominent example of a defender of the latter,
(Kuhn, 2012/1962, 102) commits himself to a retail treatment of mass when
he argues that Newton’s mass and Einstein’s mass have distinct physical ref-
erents. Kuhnian incommensurability thus implies that wholesale treatments
ought to be rejected in favor of retail ones. More generally, any holistic view
of the meaning of theoretical terms shares this commitment. If the meaning
of a theoretical term is fixed entirely by a set of descriptions or operations,
then any change in the set of those descriptions or operations results in a dis-
tinct entity. To take a recent example, (Worrall, 2011, 169) argues that our
knowledge of theoretical entities is purely descriptive, and that the Ramsey
sentence of a theory yields the relevant description. Distinct theories with
distinct Ramsey sentences will therefore involve distinct theoretical entities,
in which case Worrall’s position entails a commitment to retail treatments
of theoretical entities.
Wholesale treatments have had prominent defenders as well. For some
time now, scientific realists in the tradition of Boyd (1981) and Putnam
(1975) have been opposed to Kuhnian incommensurability and to holistic
views of meaning more generally, and have thus embraced wholesale treat-
ments over retail ones. Putnam’s work on meaning and reference is particu-
larly important in this regard, as it showed the possibility of distinct theories
referring to the same entity. As is well known, Putnam’s work, combined with
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that of Kripke (1980), convinced many philosophers that the mechanisms in
virtue of which reference is fixed, and those in virtue of which distinct speak-
ers can refer to the same entity, must, at least in part, be causal. This
conviction has survived for some time now, as one can see in more recent
work by Psillos (1999), and Stanford and Kitcher (2000), who incorporate
causal elements into their theories of reference so as to allow for wholesale
treatments of theoretical entities.
These views, at least as I have discussed them, individuate theoretical
entities by appeal to specific views about meaning, and it may seem that
such consequences can only result from conflating issues in the philosophy of
language with issues in metaphysics. But this is not the case. Given that the
notion of theoretical entity at issue here concerns our conceptions, the ques-
tion of individuation concerns the individuation of those conceptions. The
question of realism concerns the correspondence between those conceptions,
individuated in a particular way, and empirical entities that exist indepen-
dently of us.
While wholesale and retail treatments are not new, they have, in the past,
been wedded to wholesale positions in the realism debate, with wholesale re-
alists generally advocating wholesale treatments and wholesale anti-realists
advocating retail treatments.6 Although this may be well-traveled ground
when it comes to wholesale positions in the debate, it’s as yet an open ques-
tion whether retail realists ought to opt for wholesale treatments or retail
ones. Given the terminology that I’ve introduced, my view that they should
opt for the latter should come as no surprise.
In the remainder of the paper, I will argue that the commitment to whole-
sale treatments is a wholesale element that retail realists ought to reject, and
I will do so by examining a case from the history of chemistry involving the
so-called muriatic radical. My goal is to argue that there are distinct muriatic
radicals in distinct theories, and that we ought to be realists about some, but
not others. In that case, a retail treatment is preferable to a wholesale one.
Given the importance of the historical details to the argument that I aim
to give, in the next section, I concern myself with an examination of those
details.
6There are, of course, exceptions—for example, Worrall (op. cit.) defends a form of
structural realism, while Stanford (2006) has gone on to defend a form of anti-realism.
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3 The Case of the Muriatic Radical(s)
My goal in this section is to discuss the case of the muriatic radical, which
chemists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries hypothesized to
be a constituent of muriatic acid, now known as hydrochloric acid. Though
I’ll sometimes write of ‘the’ muriatic radical for ease of exposition, I will
argue in the next section that this locution is a bit misleading—since we
can and should distinguish different radicals in different theories, it would
be more accurate to call it the case of the muriatic radicals . For the time
being, though, I will attempt to remain neutral on this issue, and I will focus
on the radical as it appears in the work of three chemists, namely, Lavoisier,
Davy, and Berzelius. However, before doing so, it will be necessary to say
something about the state of chemistry before chemists hypothesized the
muriatic radical.
3.1 The Prehistory of the Muriatic Radical
Chemists in the later years of the eighteenth century worked with a scheme
for classifying substances that included a kind of substance that they called
acids, and they used a number of properties in order to distinguish acids from
non-acids. Nicholson’s Dictionary of Chemistry enumerates these properties
as follows:
1. Their taste is sour and corrosive, unless diluted with water.
2. They change blue vegetable colors to a red. 3. Most of them
unite with water in all proportions; and many have so strong
an attraction to that fluid as not to be exhibited in the solid
state. 4. At a moderate temperature, or in the humid way, they
combine with alkalis so strongly as to take them from all other
substances. 5. They combine with most bodies, and form com-
binations attended with many interesting phenomena; upon the
due explanation of which a great part of the science of chemistry
depends. (Nicholson, 1795, 2)
The kind acids , then, was delineated, not in terms of the inner constitution
of such substances, but phenomenologically, in terms of various properties
that chemists at the time could observe.
Of all the substances that chemists classified as acids at the time, two
will be important in what follows. The first was variously referred to as
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acid of sea-salt, marine acid, and muriatic acid, and it is what we now call
hydrochloric acid. The second was variously referred to as dephlogisticated
marine acid, oxygenated muriatic acid, and oxymuriatic acid, and it is what
we now call chlorine. For the sake of clarity, in what follows I’ll settle on a
single name for each, and I’ll refer to these two substances as muriatic acid
and oxymuriatic acid, respectively.
Chemists had been working with muriatic acid for some time, but oxy-
muriatic acid was not isolated until 1774. Scheele was the first to do so, and
though he classified the substance as an acid, he notes that it has the proper-
ties that chemists associated with acidity to a lesser extent than other acids
(Scheele, 1786/1774, 92–93). Subsequent chemists both followed Scheele’s
classification of the substance as an acid, and his acknowledgement that,
even so, it wasn’t much of an acid.7
As a proponent of the phlogiston theory, Scheele put forward the view
that oxymuriatic acid is muriatic acid devoid of its phlogiston—hence the
terminology “dephlogisticated marine acid” (ibid.: 93). On Scheele’s view,
then, oxymuriatic acid is the simpler substance, and it is a component of
muriatic acid. But while chemists followed Scheele’s classification of this
new substance, not all followed his views regarding the constitution of the
two acids.
3.2 Lavoisier’s Oxygen Theory of Acidity
In the later years of the eighteenth century, Lavoisier developed his oxy-
gen theory of acidity. His central claim regarding acids is “that oxygen is
an element common to them all, which constitutes their acidity” (Lavoisier,
1965/1789, 65). He supports this claim by appealing to three examples of
substances that combine with oxygen to form acids: phosphorus, sulphur,
and carbon, according to Lavoisier, each combine with oxygen to form phos-
phoric acid, sulphuric acid, and carbonic acid, respectively (ibid.: 60–65).
He concludes that “we must therefore, in every acid, carefully distinguish
between the acidifiable base, which Mr de Morveau calls the radical, and
the acidifying principle or oxygen” (ibid.: 65). While all acids for Lavoisier
contain oxygen, they contain different bases, or synonymously, radicals—
these constituent substances are what ground the differences between differ-
7For the latter point, see, for example, Berthollet (1788, 279), Lavoisier (1965/1789,
73), Nicholson (1795, 27), and Davy (1810a, 70).
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ent kinds of acids, and they can be simple or compound (ibid.: 115). In the
examples mentioned above, phosphorus, sulphur, and carbon are the bases
phosphoric acid, sulphuric acid, and carbonic acid, respectively.8
While Lavoisier was able to show that a number of acids contain oxygen,
he was unable to show that every acid does. Boracic acid, fluoric acid,
and muriatic acid proved to be problematic, but Lavoisier is clear that his
theory extends to these substances as well. He claims that these acids are
each composed of oxygen combined with a hypothetical radical, and indeed,
one finds the boracic radical, the fluoric radical, and the muriatic radical in
Lavoisier’s table of simple substances (ibid.: 175).
Lavoisier hypothesizes the muriatic radical in a particularly striking pas-
sage:
Although we have not yet been able, either to compose or to
decompound this acid of sea-salt, we cannot have the smallest
doubt that it, like all other acids, is composed by the union of
oxygen with an acidifiable base. We have therefore called this un-
known substance the muriatic base, or muriatic radical , deriving
this name, after the example of Mr Bergman and Mr de Morveau,
from the Latin word muria, which was anciently used to signify
sea-salt. (ibid.: 71–72)
Lavoisier’s reference to Guyton de Morveau is noteworthy, as the latter hy-
pothesizes the radical in a similar passage:
Analogy induces us to think that the muriatic acid has an acid-
ifiable base, as well as the carbonic, sulphuric, and phosphoric
acids, which like the bases of these latter, serves to give a distinct
and particular property to the produce of a combination of oxy-
gen. We could not express this substance otherwise than by the
name muriatic radical or muriatic radical principle . . . (Guyton de
Morveau, Lavoisier, Berthollet, and Fourcroy, 1788, 33–34)
In accordance with the oxygen theory of acidity, acids are not simple sub-
stances, and muriatic acid was no exception. Proponents of that theory
8This use of terminology was not restricted to acids, but was applied to kinds of sub-
stances in general. For example, gases are a kind of substance, and for Lavoisier, all gases
contain caloric; different kinds of gases differ from one another in virtue of the fact that
they have different bases (oxygen, hydrogen, etc.) (ibid.: 15).
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therefore had to hypothesize that it contains oxygen, like all other acids, and
a hypothetical base or radical—the muriatic radical.
Lavoisier and his followers also theorized about the nature of oxymuri-
atic acid, which they viewed to be a compound of oxygen and muriatic acid
(Lavoisier, 1965/1789, 73; Berthollet, 1788, 279). The view of the oxygen
theorists is thus a complete reversal of Scheele’s view, according to which
oxymuriatic acid is the simpler substance. This makes sense once one rec-
ognizes that the substance that phlogiston theorists like Scheele labeled de-
phlogisticated air is the oxygen of the oxygen theorists. The considerations
that led Scheele to classify oxymuriatic acid as muriatic acid devoid of its
phlogiston thus led the oxygen theorists to classify it as muriatic acid satu-
rated with oxygen. Thus, the muriatic radical is a constituent, not only of
muriatic acid, but of of oxymuriatic acid as well.
In sum, Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of acidity yields the following view of
the two substances: muriatic acid is made up of the muriatic radical and
oxygen, while oxymuriatic acid results from adding oxygen to muriatic acid.
For Lavoisier and those who shared his views on acidity, the muriatic radical
was therefore a hypothetical component of both of these substances.
3.3 Davy’s Work on the Acids
One of the outstanding issues in chemistry at the time was to decompose
these acids and isolate the muriatic radical. One chemist who attempted
to do so was Davy, who, for some time, shared Lavoisier’s view that both
acids contain oxygen. But in 1810, the year in which his work on the acids
culminated, Davy rejects Lavoisier’s view. In a paper read in July of that
year, Davy claims that the presence of oxygen in the acids has not been
demonstrated:
in the usual cases where oxygene is procured from oxymuriatic
acid, water is always present, and muriatic acid gas is formed;
now, as it is shewn that oxymuriatic acid gas is converted into
muriatic acid gas, by combining with hydrogene, it is scarcely
possible to avoid the conclusion, that the oxygene is derived from
the decomposition of water, and, consequently, that the idea of
the existence of water in muriatic acid gas, is hypothetical, de-
pending upon an assumption which has not yet been proved—the
existence of oxygene in oxymuriatic acid gas. (Davy, 1810b, 236)
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What really happens, then, is that the oxymuriatic acid decomposes the
water, combining with the hydrogen to form muriatic acid and leaving oxygen
as a byproduct. Since oxymuriatic acid is actually a component of muriatic
acid, and since the production of oxygen in various experiments can be traced
back to the water, the existence of oxygen in oxymuriatic acid has not been
proven. And because of this fact, combined with the fact that the components
of muriatic acid are oxymuriatic acid and hydrogen, the existence of oxygen
in muriatic acid is similarly hypothetical.
Davy’s view of muriatic acid, then, is that it is made up of oxymuriatic
acid and hydrogen, and in a striking passage, he concludes that Scheele’s
phlogiston theory yields the correct view of the acids, while Lavoisier’s oxygen
theory does not:
It is evident from this series of observations, that Scheele’s view,
(though obscured by terms derived from a vague and unfounded
general theory,) of the nature of the oxymuriatic and muriatic
acids, may be considered as an expression of facts; whilst the
view adopted by the French school of chemistry, and which, till it
is minutely examined, appears so beautiful and satisfactory, rests
in the present state of our knowledge, upon hypothetical grounds.
(ibid.: 237)
Given that Scheele held that muriatic acid contains oxymuriatic acid and
phlogiston, it may not be obvious how his view can be “an expression of
facts.” This becomes clear once one recognizes that many chemists at the
time identified phlogiston with hydrogen. Priestley did so as early as 1782
in his correspondences (Priestley, 1892, 33), and Kirwan did as well (Kir-
wan, 1789, 4–5). By the early nineteenth century, the identification of phlo-
giston and hydrogen was more-or-less commonplace in the work of many
chemists. To take an example from Davy’s work, when discussing some hy-
potheses regarding the constitution of metals, he writes of “the adherence
of their phlogiston or hydrogene,” without pausing to explain the identifica-
tion of phlogiston and hydrogen (Davy, 1808, 364). Given this identification,
Scheele’s view amounts to the claim that muriatic acid contains oxymuriatic
acid and hydrogen, which is essentially correct.
While Davy provides some moderate praise for Scheele’s view, he also
points to the shortcomings of the oxygen theory. If the principle of acid-
ity, namely, oxygen, isn’t present in these two acids, then that theory would
seem to be in serious trouble. Davy even goes so far as to speculate that
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oxymuriatic acid may be another principle of acidity, and that “on this idea
muriatic acid may be considered as having hydrogene for its basis, and oxy-
muriatic acid for its acidifying principle” (Davy, 1810b, 243). Davy, of course,
recognized that both oxygen and oxymuriatic acid are attracted to the posi-
tive surface of a Voltaic battery, while hydrogen is attracted to the negative
surface(ibid.: 241–242). It’s probable that this analogy is what led him to
speculate that oxymuriatic acid is the acidifying principle, leaving hydrogen
as the muriatic radical.
In the Bakerian Lecture that he gave in November of 1810, Davy argues
for a claim that Gay-Lussac and The´nard considered and rejected about a
year earlier, namely, that oxymuriatic acid ought to be considered an ele-
ment (Gay-Lussac and The´nard, 1809, 358). And in light of the fact that
oxymuriatic acid “has not as yet been decompounded,” and is “elementary
as far as our knowledge extends” (Davy (1811), 1), Davy pushes for a change
in terminology:
To call a body which is not known to contain oxygene, and which
cannot contain muriatic acid, oxymuriatic acid, is contrary to the
principles of that nomenclature in which it is adopted . . . (ibid.:
32)
He goes on to suggest the names ‘chlorine,’ and ‘chloric gas.’ Davy is thus
credited with showing that muriatic acid is composed of hydrogen and chlo-
rine, and that the latter is an element. And although he saw no reason to
reject the term ‘muriatic acid’ (ibid.: 33), his work shows why we now refer
to that acid as hydrochloric acid.
3.4 Berzelius’s Work on Hydracids
While Davy is credited with these achievements today, his views did not
go unchallenged. One of his most prominent critics was Berzelius, who,
for some time, opposed Davy’s views and defended a form of Lavoisier’s
oxygen theory of acidity. Berzelius frames his view in terms of Dalton’s
atomic theory, and claims that muriatic acid contains one atom of muriatic
radical and two atoms of oxygen, while oxymuriatic acid contains one atom
of muriatic radical and three atoms of oxygen (Berzelius, 1813, 254).9 He
9Though elsewhere, he puts this in terms of volumes as opposed to atoms (Berzelius,
1816, 276).
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emphasizes that, although pure muriatic acid does not contain water as a
component, that acid is incapable of existing without water, and thus the
acid with which we are familiar is impure (Berzelius, 1813, 254; Berzelius,
1816, 273). In theory then, one can add oxygen to pure muriatic acid to
obtain oxymuriatic acid. But given that muriatic acid is always mixed with
water, there’s a sense in which one can obtain the impure acid by adding
hydrogen to oxymuriatic acid. In such a reaction, the oxymuriatic acid loses
a volume of oxygen, and so is converted to pure muriatic acid. That volume
of oxygen combines with the hydrogen to form water, and hence the result is
impure muriatic acid. Regarding the radical in particular, Berzelius claims
that its nature is still unknown, and that chemists have not succeeded in
isolating it (Berzelius, 1813, 254; Berzelius, 1816, 263).
Berzelius eventually dropped his opposition to Davy, and accepted the lat-
ter’s view that muriatic acid is made up of hydrogen and chlorine, which he,
following Davy, regarded as an element (Berzelius, 1825, 180–181). However,
his theorizing about the nature of muriatic acid, and of acids more generally,
continued. More specifically, he claims that there is a class of acids, namely,
hydracids, of which muriatic acid is an example (ibid.: 181). A hydracid for
Berzelius is “a combination of a simple or compound body with hydrogen,
which, although destitute of oxygen, possesses all the essential characters of
the oxygenous acids” (ibid.: 180). Berzelius goes on to claim that “hydracids
must be regarded, therefore, as constituted of hydrogen and a peculiar rad-
ical, which, as is the case with the oxygen acids, may be either simple or
compound” (ibid.: 180). It follows, then, that on Berzelius’s view, chlorine
is the muriatic radical.
Berzelius’s view can be seen as a synthesis of the views of both Davy
and Lavoisier. On Berzelius’s view, Davy, and not Lavoisier, was correct
about the constitution of muriatic acid; however, while Lavoisier’s theory is
incorrect when it comes to muriatic acid and other hydracids, it gives the
correct results if restricted to oxygenous acids.
Berzelius’ work on hydracids shows that the muriatic radical still had
a place in chemistry well after Davy’s determination of the constituents of
muriatic acid. But, of course, this was not the case for long, and our current
theories of acidity make no reference to the acidifable radicals and bases of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
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4 How Many Muriatic Radicals Are There?
My goal at this point is to argue that, when it comes to the case of the
muriatic radical(s), a retail treatment is preferable to a wholesale one. More
specifically, I’ll argue that we ought to view Lavoisier’s radical and Berzelius’s
radical as two distinct theoretical entities, as opposed to one and the same
entity with which two scientists worked. The main thrust of my argument
is that, if we distinguish Lavoisier’s radical from Berzelius’s radical, there
are good reasons to be anti-realists about the former, and realists about the
latter. More specifically, I’ll argue that we ought to be anti-realists about
Lavoisier’s radical, because the right kind of correspondence between this
theoretical entity and an empirical entity is lacking; and that we ought to
be realists about Berzelius’s radical, because there is such a correspondence
with an empirical entity, namely, chlorine. If we adopt a wholesale treatment,
this kind of selective realism is unavailable, since such treatments do not
individuate theoretical entities at a grain fine enough. Retail treatments,
however, do individuate theoretical entities at a grain fine enough, and so
allow for this kind of selective realism. I conclude, then, that the case of the
muriatic radical requires a retail treatment as opposed to a wholesale one.
4.1 Anti-realism About Lavoisier’s Radical
In light of the fact that Lavoisier’s theory of acidity was completely wrong,
and the fact that he was completely wrong about the nature of muriatic acid
and of oxymuriatic acid, we ought to be anti-realists about Lavoisier’s radical.
He held that both substances contain oxygen, which, of course, turned out to
be false; and he held that both substances share another component, which
turned out to be false as well. Moreover, he held that this other component,
the muriatic radical, had not been isolated, and so he made no attempt
to identify the radical with any well-known substance which chemists could
isolate. For Lavoisier, then, the muriatic radical was that substance which
combines with oxygen to form both muriatic acid and oxymuriatic acid. If
that is what the muriatic radical is, then the most reasonable conclusion to
draw is that there is no such thing. In that case, we ought to be anti-realists
about Lavoisier’s radical—there is no empirical entity that corresponds to
this theoretical entity.
Although the muriatic radical is not often discussed by philosophers of
science, Chang is an exception, and his work provides some support for an
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anti-realist attitude towards Lavoisier’s radical. Though he doesn’t distin-
guish different radicals in different theories, when he claims that the radical
does not exist, he has in mind Lavoisier’s radical (Chang 2011, 417; 2012b,
54). A realist about Lavoisier’s radical would presumably have to answer the
question: which constituent of muriatic acid and of oxymuriatic acid is the
radical, and which is the principle of acidity? But as Chang rightly points
out, from the standpoint of modern chemistry, it makes no sense to ask such
a question (2011, 417). And asking such a question from the standpoint of
Lavoisierian chemistry leads to anti-realism about Lavoisier’s radical. For
Lavoisier, oxygen is the sole principle of acidity, and so there is nothing to
point to in order to support the claim that hydrogen is the radical, over the
claim that chlorine is, and vice versa. Moreover, since Lavoisier held that
muriatic acid is a component of chlorine, the latter substance would be a
particularly poor candidate for the radical, since this would entail that the
two substances are components of each other. But while hydrogen might
then seem to be a better candidate, this is not the case, given that it is not
a component of chlorine. Anti-realism about Lavoisier’s radical, then, would
seem to be the most reasonable option.
It may be objected that I’m being uncharitable to Lavoisier here, given
that there are two perfectly good entities with which one can identify his rad-
ical, namely, hydrogen and chlorine. Moreover, one needn’t actually choose
between them. For example, one might employ Field’s (1973) notion of par-
tial denotation, and defend the view that ‘muriatic radical’ denotes both
hydrogen and chlorine. Or one might employ McLeish’s (2006) notion of
disjunctive partial reference, and claim that ‘muriatic radical’ denotes ei-
ther hydrogen or chlorine. In that case, perhaps one can be a realist about
Lavoisier’s radical after all.
These strategies may yield a kind of realism about Lavoisier’s radical,
but it’s not the kind of realism with which I am concerned here. The kind of
realism that these strategies yield is a kind of semantic realism that allows for
certain claims (e.g., ‘Muriatic acid contains the muriatic radical.’) to be true.
But the kind of realism with which I am concerned is a kind of entity realism,
which concerns whether there is an empirical entity that corresponds in the
right kind of way to Lavoisier’s radical, qua theoretical entity. The suggestion
that Lavoisier’s term ‘muriatic radical’ partially denotes, in either Field’s or
McLeish’s sense, is really an admission that there is no single empirical entity
that corresponds to Lavoisier’s radical in the right kind of way. This way of
defending semantic realism, then, actually undermines, rather than supports,
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entity realism about Lavoisier’s radical. In that case, anti-realism is really
the only reasonable option regarding Lavoisier’s radical.
It could, however, be the case that other chemists had the resources to
single out a particular empirical entity as the muriatic radical. I’ll now argue
that Berzelius was just such a chemist, in which case we ought to be realists
about Berzelius’s radical.
4.2 Realism About Berzelius’s Radical
Berzelius’s views on the nature of the two substances differ in a number
of important respects from Lavoisier’s views, and these differences make it
reasonable to be a realist about Berzelius’s radical. To begin with, Berzelius
eventually came to the (correct) belief that muriatic acid is composed of
hydrogen and chlorine, and that the latter is an element. As a result, for
Berzelius, the muriatic radical is a component of muriatic acid, but not of
oxymuriatic acid. Moreover, his views on hydracids gave him a principled
way to distinguish the radical of muriatic acid, which he took to be chlorine,
from the component common to all other hydracids, namely, hydrogen. And
unlike Lavoisier, who held that the nature of the muriatic radical was, at the
time, unknown, Berzelius identifies it with a substance that chemists could,
in fact, isolate, namely, chlorine. If we are realists about chlorine, then,
and if Berzelius’s radical just is chlorine, then we ought to be realists about
Berzelius’s radical.
It may be objected that I’m being too charitable to Berzelius here. After
all, Berzelius’s views on acids were eventually discarded, and when it came
to the so-called oxygenous acids, he was just as wrong as Lavoisier. Chemists
today work with three concepts of acidity: (1) the concept of an Arrhenius
acid , which is a substance that increases the concentration of H+ ions in
water, (2) the concept of a Brønsted-Lowry acid , which is a substance that is
an H+ donor, and (3) the concept of a Lewis acid , which is a substance that
is an electron pair acceptor. None of these concepts of acidity give any sense
to the question: which constituent of an acid is the radical? In that case,
even if we ought to be realists about chlorine, perhaps our realism shouldn’t
extend to Berzelius’s radical.
To be sure, it is certainly correct that current work on acidity has left
behind the concept of a radical or acidifiable base. And Berzelius was quite
wrong about oxygenous acids, which don’t correspond to any category of
acids studied by chemists today. But in some cases, it can be reasonable to
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adopt a realist attitude toward some theoretical entity even if the theory in
which that entity appears is not completely correct. And in Berzelius’s case,
there are two considerations that tell in favor of a realist attitude toward his
radical.
First of all, as stated earlier, Berzelius’s beliefs regarding the constitution
of muriatic acid and oxymuriatic acid were by-and-large correct. And given
that he could point to a sample of chlorine, he could surely identify it with a
theoretical entity like his muriatic radical. We may object to the terminology
that he used, but it’s difficult to deny that he used that terminology to single
out a unique kind of empirical entity, namely, chlorine. Moreover, there is
no need for anything like partial denotation in the case of Berzelius’s radical,
and so semantic realism and entity realism line up.
Secondly, as Chang (2012a, 692) argues (though without discussing Berzelius’s
views), it’s at least debatable that the notion of a hydracid prefigured two
of our current conceptions of acidity. For Berzelius, hydrogen played an es-
sential role in hydracids, and it also plays an essential role when it comes
to both Arrhenius acids and Brønsted-Lowry acids. Berzelius’s view implies
that there is a class of acids, namely, hydracids, all of which contain hydro-
gen, and which differ from one another in terms of their other constituents,
which can be simple or compound. This is basically correct when it comes
to Arrhenius acids and Brønsted-Lowry acids, though it’s not true of Lewis
acids. The fact that Berzelius called the non-hydrogen constituents of these
acids ‘radicals’ doesn’t count as a reason to be an anti-realist about those
constituents. And given that Berzelius, unlike Lavoisier, successfully pointed
to something importantly right regarding the constitution of acids, it’s rea-
sonable to be a realist about his muriatic radical.
If realism about Berzelius’s radical is reasonable, one might wonder whether
there’s a way to be a realist about Lavoisier’s radical after all. More specifi-
cally, it might be the case that the reasons for identifying Berzelius’s radical
with chlorine can also be used in order to identify Lavoisier’s radical with
chlorine. To be sure, this would be a kind of retroactive identification, and
one might be suspicious of it for that reason. But it’s not clear that such a
position is indefensible, and similar positions have been defended. To take
one example, Jackman (1999) argues for a kind of semantic externalist view
that he calls temporal externalism, according to which linguistic usage sub-
sequent to some time t can be used in order to determine the referent of a
term at t. Perhaps, then, we ought to conclude that Lavoisier’s radical is
chlorine.
21
Various positions under the heading of semantic externalism may give
realists hope when it comes to some theoretical entities; but when it comes to
Lavoisier’s radical, the proper conclusion to draw is still anti-realism. When
Putnam initially discussed his principle of charity, he emphasized that it
involves assuming that speakers would accept “reasonable modifications” or
“reasonable reformulations” of their descriptions (Putnam (1975, 275), (1978,
24)). As Bensaude-Vincent (1983, 69) has emphasized, the idea that oxygen
is the acidifying principle “was not a secondary thesis in [Lavoisier’s] system,”
and Davy’s work “represented here a definite reversal of Lavoisier’s ideas on
muriatic acid.” In a similar vein, it’s not an exaggeration to claim that, if
Lavoisier were to admit the existence of hydracids, this would constitute a
complete abandonment of his theory of acidity, as opposed to a ‘reasonable
modification or reformulation.’ Putnam is clear that charity can be overdone,
and the historical details show that this is just such a case. Hence, a realist
attitude toward Berzelius’s radical doesn’t imply that we ought to be realists
about Lavoisier’s radical as well.
4.3 A Retail Treatment of the Muriatic Radical(s)
We can now see how the case of the muriatic radical(s) requires a retail treat-
ment as opposed to a wholesale one. I started by assuming a retail treatment
of the radical, and distinguishing Lavoisier’s radical from Berzelius’s. I ar-
gued that we ought to be anti-realists about the former, and realists about
the latter. This kind of selective realism is possible if and only if one adopts
a retail treatment, as opposed to a wholesale treatment. And if I’m right
that this sort of selective realism is the proper attitude to take toward these
radicals, then we have a reason in favor of a retail treatment, and against a
wholesale one.
At this stage of my argument, I’ve established, at best, that, when it
comes to the case of the muriatic radical, a retail treatment is preferable to a
wholesale one. But this, on its own, does not establish that retail treatments
are, in general, preferable to wholesale ones. In the final section, I consider
the benefits of employing retail treatments more generally.
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5 Retail Realism and Retail Treatments
As I indicated earlier, I take it that retail realism represents a genuine step
forward in the scientific realism debate, though I believe that it should be
paired with retail, as opposed to wholesale, treatments of theoretical entities.
I’ve attempted to illustrate the virtues of this combination of views when
applied to the particular case of the muriatic radical. And at this point,
I’ll indicate why I take this combination of views to constitute an attractive
position more generally, though what follows will inevitably fall short of a
full defense.
To begin with, it’s worth stating explicitly what this combination of views
looks like more generally. As I’ve framed it, one of the central questions
of the realism debate concerns the extent to which theoretical entities qua
epistemic objects correspond to empirical entities that exist independently of
our minds. A proponent of retail realism holds that we ought to attempt to
answer such questions on a case-by-case basis, in terms of retail arguments.
A proponent of retail treatments of theoretical entities holds that we ought to
individuate such entities rather finely, so that distinct theories involve distinct
theoretical entities. These two views complement one another rather nicely.
The notion of a retail treatment provides a clear account of what it means
to proceed on a case-by-case basis. And retail realism provides a framework
for showing how a particular view regarding the individuation of theoretical
entities can have important consequences for the realism debate. A proponent
of both views, then, will be concerned with examining the extent to which
particular theoretical entities in particular theories correspond to empirical
entities.
In order to develop and defend this position a bit more, I’ll close by
considering two objections: one concerning the extent to which this position
leads to a form of incommensurability, and one concerning the retail realist’s
desire to proceed on a case-by-case basis.
The first objection is that this position does, in fact, lead to a kind
of incommensurability which many philosophers of science, especially real-
ists, consider problematic. After all, I cited Kuhn as a proponent of retail
treatments. Moreover, if we individuate theoretical entities as finely as we
individuate theories, then we may seem forced to conclude that there’s no
sense in which distinct theories are about the same entities.
The second objection is that, although this position amounts to a combi-
nation of retail realism with retail treatments of theoretical entities, it is still
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not ‘retail’ enough. Ideally, a retail realist would proceed on a case-by-case
basis when determining whether a retail or wholesale treatment of a given
theoretical entity is preferable, and would be free to choose a retail treatment
in some cases, and a wholesale treatment in others. It’s certainly possible
that one may examine a case with the following characteristics: Retail re-
alism, combined with a wholesale treatment, yields realism about a single
theoretical entity, while retail realism, combined with a retail treatment,
yields realism about all of a multitude of similar, but distinct, theoretical
entities. It may be objected that a retail treatment of such a case would
be ontologically profligate, perhaps even untenable, and that a wholesale
treatment would therefore be desirable in the kind of case in question.
I believe that these two objections are, in fact, related, and so I’ll attempt
to answer both at once. To begin with, I have some sympathy with the second
objection, but I believe that any perceived virtues of wholesale treatments are
also virtues of retail treatments, but not vice versa. I’ve already illustrated
a case in which it’s desirable to adopt a retail treatment, as opposed to a
wholesale one, which shows that retail treatments have virtues that wholesale
treatments don’t. As for the kind of case discussed in the previous paragraph,
once one is clear about what is involved in the wholesale and retail treatments
of such a case, the objection disappears. On the wholesale treatment, realism
consists of the right kind of correspondence between a theoretical entity x
and an empirical entity y. On the retail treatment, realism consists in the
right kind of correspondence between each of a set of theoretical entities
x1, . . . , xn and y. To be sure, the ontology involved in the retail treatment
involves more entities than the ontology involved in the wholesale treatment.
But these are theoretical entities, and given that they appear in distinct
theories, there are important differences between them. In that case, it is not
ontologically profligate to distinguish them, and retail treatments are actually
preferable to wholesale treatments on the grounds that retail treatments do
draw such distinctions. It may, of course, be ontologically profligate, or
even untenable, to posit distinct empirical entities to which these theoretical
entities correspond, but a retail treatment needn’t be committed to such a
consequence. And given that distinct theoretical entities can, and sometimes
do, correspond to the same empirical entity, commensurability is at least
possible, in which case the first objection disappears as well.
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